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N o one knows precisely how Hans Lippershey came upon the invention. One legend holds that some children 
wandered into his spectacle shop, began 
playing with the lenses on display, and sud-
denly started to laugh. Tiny objects far away 
appeared as though they were right in front 
of them. The miniscule had become gigantic. 
Though the truth of that tale is doubtful, the 
story of the telescope’s invention remains a 
mystery. We know only that four centuries 
ago, on October 2, 1608, Hans Lippershey 
received a patent for a device that is still recog-
nizable as a modern refractory telescope.
Not long after Lippershey’s patent, the 
device found its way to Pisa, Italy, where it 
was offered to the Duchy for sale. Catching 
wind of this new invention, Galileo Galilei 
quickly obtained one of the instruments, 
dissected its construction, and redesigned it 
to his liking.1 Galilei intended it, of course, 
for star gazing, but his loftier intentions were 
not shared by the Pisans. This new tool had 
immediate and obvious military applications. 
Any commander who could see enemy ships 
at great distances or opposing armies across 
battlefields would instantly gain a distinct 
advantage. That commander would, in effect, 
be looking forward in time. And with that 
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literal foresight, he could predict aspects of the 
enemy’s actions. 
The telescope offered its owner a previ-
ously unimaginable advantage in battle. It 
brought the invisible to light. It altered the 
perception of time. It presented a genuine 
glimpse into the future, beyond what the 
naked eye could see. We don’t know whether 
Lippershey, Galilei, or some other crafty 
inventor made the first telescope sale to a 
military, but when he did, that exchange 
represented one of the earliest mergers of 
enlightenment science with the business of 
war. From that moment on, modern science 
has been searching for ways to extend that 
glimpse into the future, and militaries have 
been eager to pay for it.
In the 17th century, merely gaining an 
early glimpse of the enemy’s actions was 
enough to advantage one side over the other. 
By the 20th century, strategists sought much 
more. They needed greater predictive power 
for anticipating enemy moves. Technology 
alone could not, and still cannot, fill that gap. 
Strategists have always needed to develop a 
sense of the enemy, but the craving for more 
concrete, reliable predictions has also made 
militaries easily seduced by science. Lately, 
that longing has led them to focus on the 
wrong objective: predicting the unpredictable.
Number Worship 
Predictions in military and foreign affairs 
fall broadly into two types. They focus either 
on large-scale societal transformations or the 
actions of individuals. The recent uprisings 
soldiers scout perimeter for taliban forces
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across the Arab Middle East, just as with the 
Soviet Union’s collapse, demonstrated yet 
again how unlikely it is to foresee such macro-
level changes. At best, we can assess when 
societies are at risk, but predicting revolutions 
remains the stuff that dreams are made of. 
Yet it is a dream that will not die. The Central 
Intelligence Agency continues to invest in a 
Political Instability Task Force, which might 
identify the correlates of instability but cannot 
provide the kind of early warnings that politi-
cians crave. The Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency tried to launch a political 
futures market back in 2003, but had to scrap 
it when the public disapproved. It seemed 
somehow unsavory to be betting on upheav-
als. Though private futures markets have been 
thriving, they, too, failed to presage the latest 
spate of Arab revolts. 
In response to many failings, behav-
ioral scientists have been shattering crystal 
balls. The Berkeley scholar Philip Tetlock 
has been widely cited for revealing that the 
more renowned the expert, the more likely 
his predictions will be false.2 The Harvard 
psychologist Daniel Gilbert tells us that we 
cannot even predict what will bring us joy 
since our expectations are almost always off.3 
And the gleefully irreverent market trader 
Nassim Taleb argues that the massive impact 
of black swans—improbable but surpris-
ingly frequent anomalies—makes any effort 
at prediction fruitless.4 Most notable of all, 
the economist Dan Ariely has exposed the 
flawed models for predicting our behavior in 
everything from the products we buy to the 
daily choices we make.5 Of course, they are 
all right. We are abysmal at prediction. But 
the skeptics have missed a crucial point: we 
have no other choice.
Large-scale predictions will continue 
because they must. Governments and mili-
taries cannot function without them.6 And 
leaders will continue to be frustrated by their 
performance. In contrast, predicting individ-
ual actions—gaining a sense of the enemy—is 
a skill that can be developed and improved.
For better or worse, this sense of the 
enemy can only be partly aided by science. 
Simulation games, such as Gemstone, can be 
useful in shifting leaders’ thoughts toward 
cultural perceptions of military actions, but 
as with all algorithm-based models, they are 
limited by their rigid information inputs.7 
Despite this ineluctable fact, quantifying 
human behavior remains in vogue. Frequently 
funded by the Defense Department, political 
scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita insists 
that foreign affairs can be predicted with 
90 percent accuracy using his own secret 
formula. Of course, most of his 90 percent 
accuracy likely comes from predictions that 
present trends will continue—which typically 
they do.
The crux of Bueno de Mesquita’s model 
rests largely on the inputs to his algorithm. He 
says that in order to predict what people are 
likely to do, we must first approximate what 
they believe about a situation and what out-
comes they desire. He insists that most of the 
information we need to assess their motives is 
already available through open sources. Clas-
sified data are rarely necessary. On at least this 
score, he is probably correct. Though skillful 
intelligence can garner some true gems of 
enemy intentions, most of the time neither 
the quantity nor the secrecy of information 
is what matters most in predicting individual 
behavior. What is important is the relevant 
information and the capacity to analyze it.
The crucial problem with Bueno de 
Mesquita’s approach is its reliance on con-
sistently accurate, quantifiable assessments 
of individuals. A model will be as weak as its 
inputs. If the inputs are off, the output must 
be off—and sometimes dramatically so, as 
Bueno de Mesquita is quick to note on his own 
Website: “Garbage in, garbage out.” Yet this 
awareness does not dissuade him from some 
remarkable assertions. Take for example the 
assessments of Adolf Hitler before he came to 
power. Bueno de Mesquita spends one section 
of his book The Predictioneer’s Game explain-
ing how, if politicians in 1930s Germany had 
had access to his mathematical model, the 
Socialists and Communists would have seen 
the necessity of cooperating with each other 
and with the Catholic Center Party as the 
only means of preventing Hitler’s accession to 
Chancellor.8 He assumes that Hitler’s oppo-
nents could easily have recognized Hitler’s 
intentions. He further assumes that the Cath-
olic Center Party could have been persuaded 
to align against the Nazis, an assumption that 
looks much more plausible in a post−World 
War II world. In 1932, the various party 
leaders were surely not envisioning the future 
as it actually unfolded. Their actions at the 
time seemed the best choice in a bad situation. 
No mathematical model of the future would 
likely have convinced them otherwise. Assess-
ments are only as good as the assessors, and 
quantifying bad assessments will yield useless 
if not disastrous results.
None of this means that all efforts at 
prediction are pure folly. Bueno de Mes-
quita’s larger aim is worthy: to devise more 
rigorous methods of foreseeing behavior. 
An alternative approach to his quantitative 
metrics is to develop our sense for how the 
enemy behaves. Though less scientific, it 
could be far more profitable, and it is clearly 
very much in need.
Sense and Sensible Solutions 
More than two millennia ago, Chinese 
military philosopher Sun Tzu advised generals 
to know their enemy. The question has always 
been how. Writing in 1996 in the New York 
Review of Books, philosopher Isaiah Berlin 
argued that political genius—the ability to 
synthesize “the fleeting, broken, infinitely 
various wisps and fragments that make up life 
at any level”—is simply a sense—you either 
have it or you do not. But what if Berlin was 
wrong? What if that sense could actually be 
learned and improved?
That sense of the enemy could have been 
of use in 2010, when, hoping to induce the 
Afghan insurgents into peace talks, U.S. and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
officials paid an undisclosed and hefty sum to 
Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour for his 
participation, at one point flying the Taliban’s 
second-in-command to meet with President 
Hamid Karzai in Kabul. Unfortunately, the 
Taliban commander was a fake, a shopkeeper 
from Quetta, Pakistan.9 The episode showed 
how poorly the United States knows its enemy 
in this ongoing war. On one level, U.S. and 
NATO officials could not even identify the 
number-two man in their opponent’s organi-
zation. On the more strategic level, they could 
not recognize that throughout three separate 
meetings, the impostor never once requested 
that foreign troops withdraw from Afghan 
soil—a staple of Taliban demands.
gleefully irreverent market trader Nassim Taleb argues that the 
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What U.S. and NATO negotiators 
needed was strategic empathy: a sharpened 
sensitivity to their enemy’s underlying drivers 
and constraints. For much of the U.S. war 
in Afghanistan, it seems that the Afghans 
have possessed a greater degree of strategic 
empathy for the Americans than the other 
way round. It is this crucial weakness that 
needs to change, and it will not come through 
complex algorithms or high-tech tricks.
Strategic empathy is the ability to think 
like your enemy. It is the skill of stepping out 
of our minds and into the heads of others. 
It is what allows us to pinpoint what truly 
drives and constrains the other side. The 
best strategic empaths can achieve a good, 
though certainly never foolproof, ability to 
predict the actions of others—individuals 
or small groups. Unlike stereotypes—which 
reduce others to broad, simplistic categories in 
order to assess their nature and predict their 
actions—strategic empathy identifies what is 
unique both in individuals and their context. 
One of its keys lies in determining which 
information is most crucial to observe.
Knowing how another thinks depends 
initially on gathering and analyzing infor-
mation. Most leaders use the great mass 
approach. They gather up as much data as 
they can. The problem, of course, is that it is 
too easy to drown in an ocean of noise. In a 
recent Armed Forces Journal article, Colonels 
Kevin Benson and Steven Rotkoff noted the 
idea that “there are specific knowable causes 
that are linked to corresponding effects 
dominates military thinking and manifests 
in our drive to gather as much information as 
possible before acting.” Determining which 
data matter and connecting the dots then 
grows even harder. In contrast to the great 
mass approach, others believe that a “thin 
slice” of information is more effective at 
reducing noise and revealing someone’s true 
nature. The obvious danger is that we often 
choose the wrong slice, as author Malcolm 
Gladwell graphically showed in Blink.10 The 
conclusion here is inescapable: the quantity 
of information is irrelevant; it is the relevance 
of any quantity that matters. The key is not 
to collect a great mass or a thin slice, but the 
right chunk. The challenge that has long 
bedeviled analysts and statesmen alike is to 
find heuristics—shortcuts—to help them 
locate the right chunk in any given context. 
Psychologists point to a wide range of cogni-
tive biases that lead us astray from finding 
and correctly interpreting the right chunks. 
The knack for avoiding these cognition traps 
is the “sense” to which Sun Tzu and Isaiah 
Berlin allude.
Fostering a sense of the enemy typically 
involves gathering information specifically 
on intentions and capabilities. By examin-
ing these two elements of power, the experts 
believe they can comprehend or even antici-
pate the adversary’s behavior. This catego-
rization is, however, far too narrow. A more 
inclusive categorization focuses on drivers 
and constraints.
This first step in strategic empathy 
has nothing mysterious about it. Instead, it 
involves a cold assessment of strategic con-
straints. We look first not at what the other 
side might want to do but what it is able to 
do based on context. Capabilities are not 
constraints. Capabilities are what enable us 
to achieve our wants, but constraints are what 
render those capabilities useless. International 
relations experts too often think about capabil-
ities in mainly military terms. They count mis-
siles and tanks, factor in firepower, and dissect 
strategic doctrine for clues to enemy inten-
tions. If China builds an aircraft carrier today, 
it must be planning to challenge America on 
the high seas. But military capabilities, like 
intentions, are often constrained by nonmili-
tary factors, such as financial, political, orga-
nizational, environmental, or cultural impedi-
ments to action. Even something as ineffable 
as the Zeitgeist can be a powerful constraint, 
as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and 
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi recently 
discovered. Strategic empaths seek out the 
less obvious, underlying constraints on their 
enemy’s behavior as well as their own. 
Once the underlying constraints are 
understood and it is clear that the enemy actu-
ally has room to maneuver, strategic empaths 
turn to exploring the enemy’s key drivers. 
Again, we must distinguish between intentions 
and drivers. If intentions are the things we 
want to do, drivers are what shape those wants. 
We can be driven by an ideological worldview, 
such as communist, capitalist, or racialist 
dogma. We can be driven by psychological 
make-ups, with all the myriad complexes and 
schemas they entail. Or we could be driven by 
religious and cultural imperatives: conquer 
the infidels; convert the heathens; or Russify, 
Francofy, or democratize the other. 
Political scientists have produced a vast 
literature on enemy intentions. Each scholar 
offers an ever more nuanced explication of 
how states signal their intentions and how 
other states perceive them. Yet intentions are 
only fully anticipated when the underlying 
drivers are clearly understood. In an ideal 
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case, strategic empaths would not bother 
to assess intentions without first divining 
drivers. In reality, of course, most statesmen 
cannot first determine constraints and then 
turn to drivers. Typically that analysis occurs 
in tandem, or in whichever order circum-
stances allow.
From wargames with red teams to 
scenarios and software programs, militaries 
employ a variety of methods for thinking like 
the enemy. Though these approaches can be 
helpful, they often lack a truly imaginative 
spark. They are either grounded in social 
science theories, which themselves may be 
of limited reliability, or they draw on the 
perspectives of those steeped in the American 
military culture. One less-frequented avenue 
is to recruit the experts in understanding 
what drives characters to act. Successful 
novelists, among others in the arts and 
humanities, devote themselves to putting 
themselves into others’ heads. They concen-
trate on boring down to a character’s essence, 
stripping away pretext to uncover deep-seated 
motivations. And they typically achieve this 
without relying on the latest trend in psycho-
logical, sociological, or other social science 
theories. Instead, they do it the old-fashioned 
way—through incisive observation and 
thoughtful analysis of what makes different 
people tick. 
Rather than diverting labor hours, 
energy, and brain power—not to mention 
money—to speculating on the unknowable, 
analysts should instead be concentrating 
on developing their sense of the enemy as 
individuals. In recent years, the U.S. mili-
tary has been turning to outside sources for 
their insights into enemy intentions. It has 
increasingly employed the skills of social 
scientists, particularly anthropologists, to 
help it traverse complex cultural terrain. It is 
time now to enlist the aid of more experts in 
the arts when seeking foresight into others’ 
actions. To take one example, successful nov-
elists are highly astute at developing strategic 
empathy for another’s character. They devote 
themselves to identifying someone’s less 
obvious drivers and constraints. Likewise, the 
best actors must learn to get inside another’s 
head, penetrating to the core of a character’s 
deepest wants and fears. We do not need an 
army of Hollywood guilds. What we need is 
to learn the skills that good fiction writers, 
actors, and others in the arts and humanities 
have developed when thinking about what 
makes a human being tick.
Militaries, by nature, crave metrics and 
checklists. If it smells too artsy, they think it 
has no use. This attitude can only act to their 
detriment, especially for the U.S. military, 
which finds itself increasingly at odds not only 
with cultures that are possessed of dramati-
cally divergent perspectives from their own, 
but also with individuals. The average Ameri-
can Soldier cannot be expected to land in 
Fallujah or the Korangal Valley and suddenly 
possess a deep appreciation for what the locals 
truly want. It is instead the responsibility 
of strategic planners to seek out all reason-
able means of knowing the people—and the 
persons—with whom that Soldier engages. 















In addition to exploring how the arts 
and humanities develop a sense for others’ 
key drivers, we could also profit from more 
in-depth studies of historical figures who 
have successfully managed to do so. Isaiah 
Berlin’s dismissal notwithstanding, there may 
be much to glean from past strategic empaths, 
not least being some clues for how they 
achieved their skill. I suspect we might find at 
least two traits. First, rather than synthesizing 
vast amounts of information, the best strategic 
empaths learned how to filter out the ocean 
of noise and identify the right chunks of 
data. Second, instead of straining to see pat-
terns in enemy behavior, they focused on the 
pattern breaks. This means that they, unlike 
their peers, already had a general sense of the 
patterns and could quickly spot the breaks. 
Anyone who ever received a call from a credit 
card company alerting him to unusual activ-
ity on his account knows that MasterCard 
and Visa employ sophisticated algorithms 
to identify purchasing patterns and sudden 
deviations. This is a realm in which comput-
ers provide enormous added value. But in the 
realms where human behavior is less ame-
nable to quantification, we must supplement 
number crunching with an old-fashioned 
people sense. It is here that historical records 
might contain an untapped trove. 
The ability to get out of our own minds 
and into the heads of others is one of the 
oldest challenges we face. It is tough enough to 
do it with people we know well. Attempting it 
with those from foreign cultures is immeasur-
ably harder. It should be obvious that even 
small-scale, individual actions can never be 
perfectly anticipated since so much of human 
behavior rests upon contingencies and chance. 
That said, we can still enhance our strategic 
empathy by retraining ourselves to approach 
prediction differently. We will never find 
the Maltese Falcon of grand societal predic-
tions. But we can improve our predictions of 
individual and small group behavior. Even a 
modest refinement in our ability to think like 
others could have substantial payoffs both in 
winning wars and, more crucially, in sustain-
ing the peace.  JFQ
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Russian-American  
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an Age of Vulnerability
David C. Gompert and Michael 
Kofman call for the United 
States and Russia to raise their sights from 
linear numerical progress to qualitative transforma-
tion of their strategic relationship. With the new Stra-
tegic Arms Reduction Treaty in place, the countries 
should expand negotiations to include cyber and space, 
by agreeing not to be the first to attack the other’s 
critical computer networks and not to use nuclear or 
antisatellite weapons against the other. By reducing the 
utility of nuclear weapons and mitigating vulnerabil-
ites in space and cyberspace, mutual strategic restraint 
would serve U.S. interests, while even an undemocratic 
Russia should be receptive to such restraint.
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that would include reciprocal pledges not to be the 
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the other and not to be the first to attack the other’s 
critical computer networks. Such pledges would be 
reinforced by regular high-level communications 
and specific confidence-building measures.
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T he United States and Russia have sought to reduce the danger of nuclear war by limiting offensive strategic capabilities through nego-tiated agreements, relying on mutual deterrence based on reciprocal threats and the corresponding fear of retaliation. Although nuclear arsenals have been pared, this is fundamentally the same way the United States and Soviet Union sought to reduce the danger of nuclear war during the Cold War, when both were impelled to do so because they were adversaries and able to do so despite being adversaries. It is ironic—not to say unimaginative—that although the two are no longer adversaries, they stick to a path chosen when they were. This current approach is inadequate given new strategic vulnerabilities brought on by technological change. Both the opportunity and the need now exist for a different, more ambitious approach to avoiding strategic conflict—one designed for new possibilities as well as new vulnerabilities. The United States and Russia can and should raise their sights from linear numerical progress to qualitative transformation of their strategic relationship. Accordingly, while not discarding mutual deterrence or nuclear arms con-trol, this paper calls for three basic changes in approach:1◆◆  The scope of the effort to prevent strategic conflict should be widened to include two additional domains: space and cyberspace.◆◆  The aim of the effort should shift from controlling capabilities to elimi-nating threats and dangers of those capabilities being used.◆◆  The effort’s political premise should be that because both countries now truly seek a nonadversarial relationship, each can agree not to be the 
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Key Points
◆◆  With the New Strategic Arms Re-duction Treaty in place, the United 
States and Russia should expand 
negotiations to include cyberspace 
and space.
◆◆  Further, the United States and Russia should agree not to be the 
first to use nuclear or antisatellite 
weapons against the other or the 
first to attack the other’s critical computer networks. In view of its NATO obligations, the United States must insist that Allies be covered. Such strategic restraint would rely on mutual deterrence 
in all three domains, buttressed by 
cooperative measures.
◆◆  By reducing the utility of nuclear 
weapons and mitigating vulner-abilities in space and cyberspace, 
mutual strategic restraint would serve U.S. interests, and Russia should be receptive.
◆◆  The undemocratic character of Russia’s government should not prevent the United States from seeking an understanding that serves its interests, though it will 
have to be satisfied that its partner 
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F or all their power, both the United States and China are increasingly vulnerable. Each faces a range of strategic dangers, from nuclear weap-ons to disruption of critical computer networks and space links.1 Be-cause their relationship is at once interdependent and potentially adversarial, the United States and China are especially vulnerable to each other: interde-pendence exposes each to the other, while the potential for conflict impels each to improve strategic capabilities against which defenses can be futile. Strategic vulnerability cannot be eliminated, only mitigated.Of the two countries, the United States is stronger in offensive strategic capabilities, notably in nuclear, antisatellite (ASAT), and cyber weapons. Yet it is also increasingly exposed to danger in these domains, confirming that power does not necessarily reduce vulnerability. If Americans thought before the 9/11 terrorist attacks that being the only superpower made them safer, they think oth-erwise now. Even with a $600-billion-plus annual defense budget, the United States cannot buy its way out of strategic vulnerability.Meanwhile, China’s stunning economic and technological development is enabling it to acquire all forms of power, including offensive strategic ca-pabilities. But China’s development is also making it more vulnerable, as its economy becomes more integrated at home and with the world, more dependent on information, and thus more susceptible to disruption. While the Chinese have long felt, based on their history, that weakness breeds vul-nerability, they are learning that greater vulnerability can also accompany greater strength.This Strategic Forum, derived from our book The Paradox of Power, con-fronts the fact that as power grows so does vulnerability.2 The basic reason is that 
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Key Points
◆◆  Despite their vast power, the United States and China are becoming increasingly and mutu-
ally vulnerable to attack in three 
strategic domains: nuclear, space, 
and cyberspace. The futility of de-
fense and dim prospects for arms 
control in these domains will lead 
both countries to develop strong 
offensive capabilities, at least to 
deter the other.
◆◆  The United States and China should deal with these vulnerabil-
ities by pursuing mutual restraint 
in the use of strategic offensive 
capabilities in all three domains, 
building on a foundation of mutual deterrence based on the 
threat of retaliation.
◆◆  A strategic restraint agreement should include reciprocal pledges 
not to be the first to use nuclear or antisatellite weapons against the other or the first to attack the 
other’s critical computer networks. 
These pledges should be reinforced 
by regular high-level communica-tions about capabilities, doctrines, 
and plans, as well as concrete confidence-building measures to avoid misperceptions, provide reas-
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